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NOTES 
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MINIMUM COMMISSION 
RATE STRUCTURE: ANTITRUST ON WALL STREET 
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,l the Supreme Court refrained 
from totally immunizing the activities of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) from the restraints of the antitrust laws by exempting only those 
"particular instances of exchange self-regulation which fall within the 
scope arid purposes of the Securities ·Exchange Act .... " 2 While this de-
cision represented a unique approach to the continuing controversy over 
the accommodation of two conflicting economic modelil-the regulatory 
and the competitive-it left to the lower federal courts the task of deter-
mining the exact scope of the Exchange's exemption on a case-by-case 
basis. In Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers4 one aspect of the Exchange's self-
regulatory system, the minimum rate structure, was unsuccessfully attacked 
as violative of the antitrust laws, and after the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari,5 Wall Street financiers thought the battle had been won.6 Far 
tfrom being settled, however, the issue has again been spotlighted. In a 
memorandum7 submitted in response to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's invitation for comments on a proposed rule to modify the rate 
1373 U.S. 341 (1963), discussed at notes 94-107 hrfra and accompanying text. Silver 
was the "first and only expression of the Supreme Court with respect to the relation-
slip between the securities laws and the antitrust laws .... " 111 CoNG. REc. 19019 
(1965) (letter from Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman, to Sen. A. Willis Robertson, 
Chairman of Senate Committee on Banlring and Currency.) 
2 373 U.S. at 361. 
B See, e.g., Helrnetag, Railroad Mergers: Tbe Accom:modation of tbe Interstate Com-
merce Act and Antitrust Policies, 54 VA. L. REv. 1493 (1968). 
4 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 954 (1967), discussed at notes 108-119 infra and accompanying text. 
5 389 U.S. 954 (1967) CWarren, C. J., dissenting). 
6 The Wall Street Journal, referring to the case as a "landmark action," grossly 
overstated its holding by concluding that the NYSE was "immune from antitrust chal-
lenge in fixing uniform commission rates .... " Wall St. Journal, Nov. 14, 1967, at 
2, col. 1. 
7 Selected C011mzents on SEC Proposed Rule on Give-ups and NYSE Proposal on 
Commission Rates, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. No. 198 at 16-31 (extra ed. May 3, 1968) 
[hereinafter cited as SEC C011mzents on Proposed Rule]. On January 17, 1969, the 
Department of Justice :filed another memorandum proposing a five-year plan for the 
gradual elimination of :fixed commission rates. Fixed rates on all trading exceeding 
$50,000 would be abolished immediately; thereafter, the ceiling would be lowered by 
$10,000 per year. Department of Justice, Memorandum of the Department of Justice 
before the SEC, Commission Rate Structure of Registered National Securities Ex-
changes, File No. 4-144, Jan. 17, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Memo.]. 
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structure,8 the Department of Justice challenged the antitrust exemption 
afforded the minimum commission rates. This "surprising entry" 9 prodded 
the SEC to hold public hearings10 to explore "whether a minimum exchange 
commission rate structure is necessary, and if so to what extent . "n 
OVERVIEW OF THE CoMMISSION RATE STRUCTURE 
The antitrust problems currently raised by the 1'-T'iSE's rate structure have 
their origin in the rules and practices which have traditionally charac-
terized the Exchange and have determined its relationship to the rest of the 
securities industry.12 The NYSE has set its own commission rates since the 
Buttonwood Agreement of 1792.13 These minimum rates,I-4 prescribed by 
8 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968) (restricting give-ups). 
See note 37 infra. 
9 vVall St. Journal, April 30, 1968, at 34, coL 1. Nor did the challenge escape the 
fanfare of election year politics. President NL'I:On, during the recent campaign, referred 
to the Justice Department intervention as a "heavy-handed bureaucratic regulatory" 
scheme, Wall St. Journal, Oct. 3, 1968, at 4, col. 3, and a Republican National Committee-
man instituted suit to delay SEC proposals until after the inauguration of the new 
president, YVashington Post, Oct. 12, 1968, at E7, col. 1. 
lO SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968). For statutory 
authority to call public hearings, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u (a) (1964). 
Congressional leaders have also expressed a keen interest in the subject. See \Vash· 
ington Post, Dec. 14, 1968, at E9, coL 1 (Sen. Harrison \Villiams, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Bani{ing and Currency, 
announced future hearings to consider the antitrust implications of minimum com-
mission rates); \Vall St. Journal, Dec. 11, 1968, at 3, coL 2 (Rep. Emanuel Celler, 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, urged antitrust action against the 1'-.lYSE 
to invalidate Exchange Rule 394 which restricts members from trading listed stocks 
with nonmembers). See notes 46-47 infra. 
ll SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May .28, 1968) (letter from Manuel 
F. Cohen, SEC Chairman, to Robert vV. Haack, President of the NYSE). 
12 For a con1prehensive discussion of the N\!SE's rate structure, see F~EPOHT OF 
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND ExcHANGE CoMTviJSSION, 
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 294-351 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 
SPECIAL STUDY]. This study was the product of a Congressional directive to the SEC 
"to make a study and investigation of the adequacy, for the protection of investors, 
of the rules of national securities exchanges and national securities associations .... " 15 
U.S.C. § 7Bs(d) (1964). See also H.R. REP. No. 882, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
J3 vVe, the Subscribers, Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stoclc, do 
hereby solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each other, that we will not 
buy or sell from this day for any person whatsoever, any kind of Public Srock 
at a less rate than one-quarter percent Commission on the Specie value, and 
that we will give a preference to each other in our Negotiations. In Testimony 
whereof we have set our hands this 17th day of May, at New Yor1{, 1792. 
SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 295, quoting A. EA;vms, THE NEw YoRK STOCK ExcHANGE 14 
(1894). 
14 In practice, however, " [ t] he minimum has become the maximum." R. BAimR ci 
IV. CARY, CoRPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERL\LS 718 (Supp. 1968). See note 39 infra. 
1969] Antitrust on Wall Street 663 
the NYSE Constitution,11; are compulsory for Exchange membership,16 
and are followed by the American Stock Exchange and the regional ex-
changes.17 
Besides :fixing the commission for ordinary transactions, the rate structure 
precludes price competition on volume trading and ancillary services. Rates 
are :fixed as a percentage of the value of each round lot u; regardless of the 
size of the transaction.19 This round-lot system does not allow for any 
volume or block discount, despite the fact that the cost of handling a trans-
action involving a large number of shares is not proportionately higher 
than the cost of a smaller volume transaction. Ancillary services comprise 
a wide spectrum of activity, including the safekeeping of customer se-
curities, collecting dividends on stock left in the broker's care, forwarding 
proxy materials, furnishing investment advice and obtaining market quota-
tions.20 The rigid rate structure includes the cost of services in the com-
mission fee whether or not a customer takes advantage of them, but the 
provision of these services remains "the most significant area of competition 
among members of the Exchange." 21 
The NYSE rules discriminate in favor of members by charging them 
markedly lower rates than are charged nonmembers and by permitting 
members to pay separate rates for clearing and executing rather than the 
all-inclusive rate paid by outsiders.22 Moreover, members are permitted to 
u; [T]hese commissions shall be at rates not less than the rates in this Article pre-
scribed; and shall be net and free from any rebate, return, discount or allowance 
made in any shape or manner, or by any method or arrangement direct or 
indirect. 
NYSE CoNsT. art XV, § I, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GuiDE~ 1701 (1962). 
No member, allied member, member :firm or member corporation shall make a 
proposition for the transaction of business at less than the minimum rates of 
commission prescribed in this Article. 
NYSE CaNsT. art. XV, § 7, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GuiDE~ 1707 (1962). 
Any return, rebate, discount or allowance of commission resulting from an 
order given by a member ... and payable by a member ... of another exchange 
in connection with the execution of such order shall be collected by the mem-
ber . . . giving such order and may not be shared with a non-member of the 
Exchange. 
NYSE CaNsT. art. XV, § 8, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GuiDE~ 1708 (1962). 
16 NYSE CoNST. art. XV,§ 7, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE Guide~ 1707 (1962), see note 
15 supra. NYSE members transact approximately 80% of the business on the national 
exchanges. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 4 n.2 (Jan. 26, 1968). 
17 "Since 1958, the rates have been identical, and the rules governing commissions 
have also been similar in scope and effect. When the NYSE changed its nonmember 
rates in 1959, the Amex promptly followed suit." SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 299. 
18 Round lots consist of multiples of 100 shares. A different procedure is used for 
odd-lot transactions. !d. at 325. For a general discussion of odd-lot dealers, see id. at 
171-202. 
19 !d. at 31 I. 
20 !d. at 321. 
21Jd. 
22Jd. at 297. Member rates can be separated into executing only, clearing only and 
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split fees among themselves, whereas such arrangements with nonmembers 
are prohibited.23 This discrimination naturally has adverse effects on the 
nonmember professional; in order to retain his customer's business, a non-
member dealing in securities traded only on the NYSE is forced to charge 
the customer the same commission which he pays to the NYSE member, 
thereby incurring a loss equal to the expenses incident to the transaction. As 
'.vith other Exchange .iules, the J\JYSE insures compliance "\Vith its com-
mission rate rules by fining, 24 suspending or expelling25 violators. 
The prospect of losing the business of nonmember professionals has led 
to the development of practices by which members can circumvent the Ex-
change's rigid rate structure. The anti-rebate rule can be bypassed ~hrough 
various reciprocal business arrangemehts26 whereby I'\f'iSE members return 
commission business to nonmembers. This can be accomplished if a NYSE 
member places business with a broker who is only a member of a regional 
exchange even though the NYSE member occupies a seat27 on the regional 
exchange or the stock is also listed on the Big Board.28 A similar result is 
achieved by referring over-the-counter business to nonmembers in cases 
where the l'.TYSE member possess adequate facilities to execute the transac-
tion himself. Another variant calls for reciprocity in the form of special 
services. The clearance of nonexchange transactions,2ll office space,<HJ installa-
tion and maintenance of wire services,31 special research32 and promotional 
materials and displays are all sanctioned-conduits through w!:Uch returns 
clearing and executing. Executing consists of using the facilities of the Exchange 
to locate a seller (or buyer) and consummating the trade. Clearing involves making 
the arrangements for actual exchange of stock certificates. !d. at 295. 
23NYSE CoNST., art. XV,§ 8, reprinted in 2 CCI-I NYSE GUIDE~ 1708 (1962), see 
note 15 supra. 
24 NYSE CoNsT., art. A.'1V, § 13, reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GumE en 1663 (1962). 
25 N\!SE CaNsT., art. XIV, § 6, 1·eprimed in 2 CCH NYSE GumE qj 1656 (1962). An 
illustration of the severity of NYSE penalties was provided in a recent action in which 
the N'lSE suspended and fined a member 1~10,000 for violating the anti-rebate rules. 
\Vall St. Journal, Oct. 11, 1968, at 5, col. 2. 
26 For a general discussion of these practices among the mutual funds, see SPECIAL 
STUDY, pt. 4, at 213-35. 
27 See The Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941) ("multiple 
trading case" in which the SEC invalidated the 1\IYSE rule prohibiting members from 
trading listed securities on the regional exchanges). See generally SPECIAL STuDY, 
pt. 2, at 923-24. 
28 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 302. A NYSE member need only name a regional-only 
member as a "clearing agent" on the regional exchange for him to receive up to a 50% 
split fee under the regional exchange rules irrespective of the functions performed. 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 5 (Jan. 26, 1968). 
29 Rule 381, 1·ep1·inted in 2 CCH NYSE GumE qj 2381.18 (1962). 
30Rule 343, reprinted in2 CCH NYSE GUIDE en 2343.11 (1962). 
31 Rule 359, Teprimed in 2 CCI-I NYSE GumE ~ 2359.10 (1962). 
32 Rule 440, rep1"inted in 2 CCH NYSE GumE ~ 2440A (1962). 
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to nonmembers are permitted by the Exchange, even though the equivalent 
in cash is prohibited.33 
The most controversial of the remunerative methods is the so-called 
"give-up." 34 Not only does this device circumvent the anti-rebate rule, but 
it also allows discounts on volume transactions. In its most elementary form, 
a customey-3-5 directs that a specified percent of the executing broker's com-
mission, sometimes as high as sevenry:...five percent/~6 be given up to a 
designated broker. In effect, the executing NYSE broker acts as a vehicle 
through which an institutional investor can reward other brokers for 
services unrelated to the particular transaction, such as promoting mutual 
fund shares or supplying statistics, research, wire facilities and quotations.~7 
If the designated broker is a member of the NYSE and therefore within 
the ambit of the Exchange's fee-splitting rules, the give-up may be in cash; 
otherwise, other reciprocal devices are used.38 The impact of the give-up 
in undermining the NYSE rate schedule has been intensified by the fact 
that a dual member is subject to the more permissive regional exchange 
rules when trading on the regional exchanges. NYSE nonmembers have 
gained "practical access to the New York Stock Exchange" 39 because sub-
33 Rule 369(1), Teprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ~2369 (1962). The Special Study 
accurately commented that this distinction was "obviously a fine one." SPECIAL SnmY, 
pt. 2, at 304. 
34 Professor Paul Samuelson has called the device "nefarious." NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 
1968, at 89. See also SEC, REPoRT oN THE PuBuc PoLicY IMPLICATioNs oF lNVIDSTM:ENT 
Co. GRowm, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 4, at 162-88 (1966). 
35 The principal users are institutional investors, including mutual funds, foundations, 
insurance companies, educational institutions, pension funds and trust departments of 
banks. SPECIAL Sruny, pt. 2, at 837. 
36 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 3 (Jan. 26, 1968). 
37 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 317. Give-ups also create substantial conflicts of interests 
for the a managers of the investment companies because the channeled income is used 
to serve their own self-interests rather than benefit the stockholders of the fund. SEC 
Securities Release No. 8239 at 9 (Jan. 26, 1968); 33 SEC ANN. REP. 8 (1967). As a 
result of reciprocal agreements the managers are pressured into transacting business 
with participating nonmembers rather than selecting the best available market in terms 
of cost, managerial experience and expertise of the individual firm. SPECIAL STUDY, 
pt. 2, at 309-10. Accordingly, SEC rule IOb-10, proposed pursuant to the antifraud 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1964), the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-l to 80b-21 (1964), and certain 
proVisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 
(1964), "would prohibit investment company managers from directing brol{ers execut-
ing transactions for an investment company to divide their compensation in any way 
with other brokers unless the benefits of such division accrue to the investment com-
pany and its shareholders." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at I (Jan. 
26, 1968). 
38 See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text. 
39 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 11 (Jan. 26, 1968) (letter from 
Robert W. Haack, NYSE president, to Exchange members). These practices induced 
Mr. Haack to remark that the rate structure "is ceasing to be a 'ininirnum.'" !d. 
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stantially all of the securities traded on the regional exchanges are also 
traded on the Big Board4o and fee splitting with brokers who are not mem-
bers of the regional exchanges is sanctioned by the rules of the regional 
exchanges. Thus, the give-up system has resulted in a channeling of business 
from the NYSE to the regional exchanges.41 Moreover, institutional in-
vestors, attempting to irnErove their JlO~itions, have secured seats on the 
regional exchanges42 for affiliates whose sole function is to obtain give-ups 
and other reciprocal benefits for their. institutional sponsors. 43 
The rigidity of the rate structure has also led to an increase in the trading 
of NYSE listed securities in the over-the-counter market. This so-called 
third market44 is composed of nonmember firms whose operations are 
geared to the needs of the institutional customers.45 Exchange Rule 
394(a)46 'prohibits NYSE members from dealing in this market without prior 
permission.47 Free from the restrictions of Exchange rules, the third market 
permits rate reductions on volume trading and eliminates the costs of an-
40 !d. at 4 n.2. 
41 See, e.g., Phalon, Regional Exchanges A1oving in on Big Board-From Boston to 
the Coast, Their Trading is Mounting, -N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965, § 3, at 1, col. 3. 
42 See, e.g., Jennings, The New York Stock Exchange and tbe Cmmnission Rate 
Struggle, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 1119, 1142-43 (1965) (mutual fund affiliates, as members of 
regional exchanges, can trade in NYSE listed stocks without paying a commission to a 
NYSE member). 
43 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 3 (Jan. 26, 1968). !he NYSE 
has asked the SEC for a moratorium on institutional membership pending the outcome 
of the SEC hearings. Wall St. Journal, May 5, 1969, at 6, col. 2. 
44 The term was first used by the Special Study. For a general discussion of this 
market, see SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, 870-911; Weeden, Tbe Tbird Market, DuKE Um-
VERSITY ScHOOL OF LAw CoNFERENCE ON SECURITIES REGuLATION 171-90 (Mundheirn ed. 
1965); Polakoff & Sanetz, Tb~ Third Market-Tbe Nature of Competition in tbe Market 
for Listed Securities Traded Off-Board, 11 ANTimusT BuLL. 191 (1966); Comment, Tbe 
Tbird Market-C/:Jallenge to the New York Stock Exc/:Jange, 20 Sw. L.J. 640 (1966). 
Use of the third market should be distinguished from reciprocity agreements as a 
means of escaping the inflexibility of the NYSE rate structure. Give-ups are proper 
only where fixed commission rates exist; therefore, they are not used on the third 
market. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 5 (Jan. 26, 1968). 
In addition to the exchanges, over-the-counter trading in unlisted securities, and the 
third market, there exists a so-called "fourth market" in which institutional investors 
deal directly with each other. See Silberman, Bypassing Brokers-Institutional Investors 
Begin Trading Stocks Directly Among Tbemselves, Wall St. Journal, Jan. 11, 1965, 
at 1, col. I. 
45 The third market is not a complete market for bro]rers; instead, it includes a 
limited variety of securities that are favored by institutional investors. Jennings, supra 
noi:e 42, at 1151. 
-4'6 Except as otherwise specifically exempted by the Exchange, members and 
member organizations must obtain the permission of the Exchange before effecting 
a transaction in a listed stock off the Exchange, either as principal or agent. 
Rule 394(a), reprinted in 2 CCH NYSE GmnE ~ 2394 (1962). 
47At the SEC hearings, both Exchange Rule 394(a) and Rule 394(b), which pro-
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cillary services which are "of little interest or value" to institutional in-
vestors.48 Besides offering reduced commission rates, third market trading 
involves less delay for large block transactions and avoids a ticker report with 
its attendant influence on prices. 
The &te Structure: Subsequent Developments 
The intervention of the Department of Justice stimulated activity by the 
SEC and pressured the NYSE into reluctant reforms.49 Prior to this inter-
vention commission rate negotiations between the SEC and the Exchange 
had been unproductive;50 since then, the SEC riot only ordered the recent 
hearings but also submitted an interim schedule51 to the Exchange which 
included a volume discount and a caveat that the matter of give-ups was 
still "under continuing consideration." 52 Although the pressure of the Jus-
tice Department may appear to be an encroachment upon SEC jurisdiction, 
it does give the SEC leverage in dealing with the Exchange.53 Negotiations 
have led to the adoption of a NYSE plan54 which provides for a volume dis-
vides for a cumbersome and ineffective procedure for members to trade in the third 
marlret, were attacked as a concerted refusal to deal in violation of the antitrust laws. 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1968, at 67, col. 7. Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of. the 
House Judiciary Committee, has urged the Department of Justice to bring snit against 
the NYSE to invalidate Rule 394, id., Dec. 11, 1968, at 3, col. 2, but the Justice 
Department decided to wait until after the SEC hearings. Id., Jan. 8, 1969, at 2, col. 4. 
In late 1964 the NYSE proposed a volume discount in a package deal which 
also included a raise in commission rates and mandatory service fees to bring "about 
the return of some of the business lost ... to the third market.'~ ld., Dec. 31, 1964, 
at 3, col. 1 (rematlrs of Keith Funston, former NYSE President). However, some mem-
bers feared a rate war with the third market. The package deal was discarded because 
the SEC demanded "full documentation" before implementing the rate increase. Jd. One 
year later only the volume discount was still alive. ld., Jan. 3, 1966, at 4, col. l. 
48 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 5, at 140. 
49 Wall St. Journal, June 28, 1968, at 3, col. 1. 
50 /d., May 31, 1968, at 8, col 3; id., April 30, 1968, at 34, col. 1. 
51 The SEC proposed interim measures include: 
(I) the reduction of rates for that portion of an order involving round lots in 
excess of 400 shares, and alternatively, to eliminate requirements for minimum 
commissions for all orders in excess of $50,000. 
(2) the implementation of appropriate reductions in the current intramember 
rate for non-executing .firms or eliminate requirements for minimum intra-
member charges to such non-executing firms. 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968). The new schedule has 
already caused commotion on Wall Street because "[i]t's believe [sic] commission in-
come is nearly 20% below what the same transactions would have produced under 
the old schedule." Wall St. Journal, Jan. 23, 1969, at 2, col. 3. 
52 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 at 2 (May 28, 1968) (letter from 
Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman·, to Robert W. Haack, NYSE President). 
53 Wall St. Journal, April 30, 1968, at 34, col. I. 
54 The NYSE plan was a counterproposal to the one submitted by the SEC. Letter 
from Robert W. Haack to Manuel F. Cohen, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 
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count on transactions involving over 1000 shares, reduction in intra-member 
rates, and the abolition of give-ups.55 This retreat by the NYSE does not 
represent an attempt to dilute the commission rate structure, but rather an 
attempt to fortify that structure against an anticipated attack at the SEC 
hearings.5il 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
The legality of the commission rate structure has been challenged on the 
ground that it constitutes price fixing, a per se violation57 of section 1 of the 
Sherman· Act. 58 In the leading case, 59 United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil 
Co.,ilo a price fixing agreement was held to be illegal despite its reasonable-
ness,61 and in United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards,62 
(Current vol.) '1177,599 at 83,279 (1968). The SEC accepted the plan, SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 8399 (Aug. 30, 1968); the NYSE Board of Governors ap-
proved, Wall St. Journal, Oct. 11, 1968, at 3, col. 2; and the membership voted 925 to 
266 to accept, id. Oct. 25, 1968, at 2, col. 3. The American Stock Exchange version 
passed 316 to 206. ld., Nov. 4, 1968, at 6, col. 3. The NYSE has recently begun a 
comprehensive study of the entire rate structure. This effort to formulate a permanent 
schedule will last from 12 to 18 months and cost $400,000. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1969, at 
65, col. 4. 
55 See note 37 supra. As of January 2, 1968, the NYSE favored retention of give-ups 
bur with a limitation on the "percentage amount which may be so given-up." SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 12 (Jan. 26, 1968) (letter from Robert W. 
Haack, NYSE president, to Exchange members). . 
li6 "The question the Exchange must face is whether the continuance of give-up 
practices will weaken the economic basis for minimum commissions." NYSE Special 
Membership Bull., reprinted in CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. (Current 'vol.) 'II 77,564 at 
83,192 (I 968). 
57 ATToRNEY GEN.'s NAT'L CoMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT at 12 
(1955). 
58 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) makes illegal 
[ e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations .... 
For a general discussion of the applicability of the antitrust laws to the securities in-
dustry, see Asch, The Antitrust Laws and the Regulated Securities Mm·kets, 11 ANn-
TRUST BuLL. 209 (1966); Bides, Amitrust and the New YoTk Stock Exchange, 21 Bus. 
LAw. 129 (1965); Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 
20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the 
Securities Field, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 131 (1964). 
59 SEC Counnents on PTOposed Rule at 20 (comments of the Department of Justice). 
60 310 u.s. 150 (1940). 
ill 310 U.S. at 218; accord, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 
396-98 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341-42 
(1897). But see Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (standard 
is "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby 
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy compe-
tition"). See geneTally Bork & Bowman, Tbe Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 
363, 365 (1965); von Kalinowski, The Per Se DoctTine-An Emerging Philosophy of 
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involving a plan comparable to the NYSE rate structure, the Supreme Court 
held that the prescribing of standard commissions by a real estate board 
was per se unlawful: 
[A]n agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by 
proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is 
itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was de-
signed to serve.'13 
The courts have not deviated from this position in subsequent cases64 and 
the NYSE has not contested this precedent;65 instead, the Exchange relies 
upon an implied exemption theory to immunize it from antitrust liability. 
Antitrust Exemptions in General 
Antitrust exemptions can be either express66 or implied.;;7 Such exemp-
tions arise because in many areas Congress has shifted from the usual policy 
of "prohibiting restraints on competition to one of providing relief from the 
rigors of competition." 68 Because of the paramount importance attached 
Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 569 (1964); Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in 
Antitrust Law, 7 PRAC. LAw. 17, 19-21 (Nov., 1961); Montague, "Per se lllegality" and 
the Rule of Reason, 12 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 69 (1958). 
The rationale of the per se doctrine is that some practices "because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the 
precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. 
Ry. v. United States, 3_56 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
62 339 u.s. 485 (1950). 
'1>BJd. at 489. 
ll4 "Throughout the period under study [1955-1968], the courts have uniformly re-
iterated that horizontal price fixing arrangements are unlawful per se." ABA, 1955-1968 
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 2 (1968). 
tl5 The NYSE memorandum submitted to the SEC during the recent hearings docs 
not discuss price-fixing. NYSE, Memorandum of the NYSE before the SEC. 
Commission Rate Structure of Registered National Exchanges, File No. 4-144, Aug .. 
1968 [hereinafter cited as NYSE Memo.], -reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 
(Current vol.) ~ 77,587 (1968). 
66 E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1964) (Capper-Volstead exemption for agricultural coopera-
tives); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1964) (Webb-Pomerene exemption for producers export trade 
associations); 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964) (McCarren-Ferguson exemption for state regula-
tion of insurance industry); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964) (exempting labor, agricultural and 
horticultural associations); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964) (exempting state supervision of 
resale price maintenance). 
t!7 E.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a comprehensive list of exemp-
tions created by Congress and the courts up to 1961, see Pogue, The Rationale of 
Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 313, 330-54 (1961). 
6BFCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 92 (1953). 
670 Virginia Lrnv Revie·w [Vol. 55:661 
to antitrust enforcement,'69 exemptions-both express and implied-are nar-
rmvly construed.'0 Express exemptions are limited on the theory that if 
"Congress had desired to grant any further immunity, Congress doubtless 
would have said so." 71 In dealing with implied exemptions, however, courts 
have no easily discernable expression of congressional intent on which to 
rely. The argument most frequently advanced in seeking an implied exemp-
tion is that Congress, by delegating authority to a regulatory agency, has 
preempted the usual antitrust jurisdiction of the courts.'2 But this argument 
must overcome the strict standard that the Supreme Court has announced: 
"Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are 
69 See Carnation Co. v. Pacific VVestbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966) ("the 
antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy"); United States v. 
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963) (antitrust policy serves a "felt 
indispensable role ... in the maintenance of a free economy"); Pan Am. VVorld 
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 324 (1963) (the Sherman Act "embodies per-
haps the most basic economic policy of our society"); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (the Sherman Act is a "charter of freedom" 
comparable to constitutional provisions). 
70 The Supreme Court has- repeatedly declined to hold that a congressionally enacted 
regulatory scheme completely disphces the antitrust laws absent an unequivocally 
declared congressional purpose to do so. See, e.g., California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 
482, 485 (1962); cf. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) 
(Federal Communications Act held no bar to antitrust suit against TV and radio 
licenses); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (Interstate Commerce 
Act does not immunize railroads from prosecution for unfair rate fixing); Pan Am. \Vor!d 
Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1963) (broad CAB jurisdiction over 
unfair air trade practices does not preempt antitrust snits) (dictum). See also 
ABA, 1955-1968 ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 189 (1968) (concluding that judicial inter-
pretation has not substantially expanded any exemption); Orrick, The Recem Emsion 
of CeTtain AntitTust Exemptiom, 10 ANTITRUST BuLL. 667 ( 1965). 
The Court's approach to implied exemptions is analogous. Not only are they dis-
favored, see note 73 in[m, but their scope has been narrowly confined to conform 
to the need asserted. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-58 
(1963). 
For a criticism of recent Supreme Court cases applying the antitrust laws, see Merkel, 
Tbe Ot!Je1· Ami of Antitmst, 46 HARY. Bus. REv. 53 (March-April 1968). 
71 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 201 (1939). The l\TYSE has attempted to 
subvert this rationale by citing congressional inaction as proof that Congress intended 
to exempt the Exchange from the antitrust laws: "If Congress had intended otherwise, 
it would have said so." NYSE Memo. at 10,-?·epTinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current 
val.) 9177,587 at 83,235 (1968). 
72 See, e.g., Pan Am. ·vvorld Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Cali-
fornia v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 
(1959). For an analysis of an implied antitrust exemption in another context, see 
Comment, Alabmna PoweT Company v. Alabama Electric Cooperative: RuTal ElectTifi-
cntion and tbe Antitrust LG'l.vs-lnesistible Fm·ce Meets 17llmovable Object, 55 VA. L. 
REv. 325 (1969). See ge11eTally Hale & Hale, Competitiou or Comrol I: Tbe C!Jao.r iu 
tbe Cases, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 641 (1958); Hale & Hale, Competitio-n or Control VI: 
Application of AntitTwt Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1962). 
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strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy 
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." 73 
Subject to the general rule that exemptions will be narrowly construed, 
there are twogrounds on which an implied exemption may be based. First, 
an exemption may arise if an agency is responsible for enforcing some 
"competitive stand4rd clearly delineated by [statute]." 74 Although the 
Court ·Jrequently speaks of this type of exemption in terms of the "per-
vasiveness" 75 of agency regulation, extensive regulation by the Federal 
Communications Commission and the Federal Power Commission has not 
sufficed to provide an antitrust exemption.76 In United States v. Radio 
Corporation of Arnerica,17 an exchange of television stations was attacked 
as. violative of the Sherman Act.78 The Federal Communications Commis-
sion had consented to the transaction as required by section 310 (b) of the 
Communication Act of 1934.79 RCA contended that this required ap-
proval vested the FCC with primary jurisdiction and that an attack could 
be made only on direct review of the license grant. The Court rejected this 
argument holding that the Commission lacked the statutory power to 
resolve antitrust questions since its approval was based on a broad stand-
ard of "public interest, convenience, and necessity" 80 rather than on anti-
73 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-5I (1963). The principle 
is a modification of the older, more general canon of construction that "repeals by 
implication are not favored." United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 88, 92 
(1870) (dictum); see Henderson's Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 652, 657 (1870). 
However, commentators have viewed the principle as less than sacred. Kestenbaum, 
Primary Jurisdictimz to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the 
Allocation of Functions, 55 GEo. L.]. 812, 820 (1967) ("the rule is, indeed, that such 
immunity will not be implied except when the Court thinl{s it ought to be."); 33 A.B.A. 
ANTITRUST L.]. 5 (1967) ("there does not seem to be an incontestable principle that 
every exemption must necessarily be interpreted narrowly"). 
74 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963). Compare PaJ;J. 
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 37I U.S. 296 (1963), with California v. FPC, 
3iS9 U.S. 482, 485 (I962) and United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S .. 334 
(1959). 
75 See, e.g., Hale & Hale, Me1·gers in Regulated Industries, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 49, 54 
(1964) ("The hy word is 'pervasive.'"). 
76 There is doubt whether any regulatory scheme exists that is sufficiently "pervasive" 
within the Court's definition to totally displace the antitrust laws. Set~ Johnson, 
llpplication of Antitrust Laws to the Sec'qrities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536, 553 & nn.II7-18 
(I966). In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'] Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the antitrust 
laws were applied even though "[t]he regulation of banking may be more intensive 
than the regulation of any other industry .... " I K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 
§ 4.04 at 247 (1958). The Court. itself remarked that "the agencies maintain virtually 
a day-to-day surveillance of the American banking system." 374 U.S. at 329. 
77 358 u.s. 334 (1959). 
7815 U.S.C. §§I, 4 (1964). 
7947 U.S.C. § 3IO(b) (1964). 
80 !d. 
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•trust criteria.81 Similar reasoning was employed by the Court in California 
v. Federal Po'l.ver Conmzission,8z where the Government attacked the 
merger of a gas company with a pipeline company. After initiation of the 
antitrust suit, the companies submitted an application for merger and re-
·ceived Power Commission approval pursuant to section 7 of the Natural 
Gas Act.88 In holding that the administrative decision should have been 
suspended pending completion of the antitrust suit, the Court emphasized 
.that the FPC lacked the statutory authority to adjudicate antitrust issues 
and therefore could not preempt the Court's antitrust jurisdiction. 84 
A comparison of these cases with the Court's decision in Pan American 
TV mid Airrways, Inc. v. United Statess5 reveals that the requisite "pervasive-
ness" is not established merely by thorough regulation; in addition, there 
musr be something "built into the regulatory scheme ·which performs the 
antitrust function." 86 In Pan American the Court held that the Civil Aero-
nautics Board had exclusive jurisdiction over questions of injunctive relief 
against the division of territories or allocation of routes among carriers. The 
crucial factors in the Court's decision were the statutory delegation of respon-
sibility to consider some antitrust factors,87 and the explicit provision for 
81 In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied upon §§ 311, 313 of the Federal Com-
munications Act, 47 U.S.C. § § 311, 313 (1964 ), fomm·Jy 48 Stat. 1086-87 (1934). Section 
311 directed the FCC to refuse to license a station whose Ecense had been previously 
revoked by a court under § 313, which made the antitrust laws applicable to the 
"manufacture and sale of and ... trade iri radio apparatus and devices .... " 358 U.S. 
M 340 n.6. 
82 369 u.s. 482 (1962). 
83 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964) (merger conditioned upon FPC certificate of "public 
·convenience and necessity"). The Court indicated that while antitrust considerations 
are "plainly relevant" under this standard, 369 U.S. at 484, this in itself did not 
establish a "pervasive" regulatory scheme. ld. at 485. 
M The Court noted that there was no express antitrust exemption for FPC-approved 
mergers in the Natural Gas Act, nor would the Court interpret § 7 of the Clayton 
Act: 15 U.S.C. § 18 0964), to include such an exemption." 369 U.S. at 486. This 
construction is supported by § 20(a) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717s(a) 
(1964), which advises the FPC to communicate "apparent violations of the Federal 
antitrust laws to the Attorney General, who, in his discretion, may institute the 
necessary criminal proceedings." 
85 371 u.s. 296 (1963). 
S6 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 3 58 ( 1963). 
87 371 U.S. at 304. The critical provisions of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 
H 1301-1542 (1964), were § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1964) (CAB jurisdiction over 
"unfair methods of competition in air transportation"), and § § 408-409, 49 U.S.C. 
§ § 1378-1379 (1964) (CAB authority over consolidations, mergers, purchasers, leases, 
operating contracts, acquisition of control of an air carrier, and interlocking relations). 
Furthermore, the enforcement of the Clayton Act as it applies to air carriers is vested 
in the CAB, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1964). In Pan AmeTican, ho-wever, the Court went 
on to say that the CAB does not "have jurisdiction over every antitrust violation by 
air carriers." 371 U.S. at 311-12. 
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judicial review of these CAB determinations. 88 In United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank,B9 the absence of these two factors resulted in the conclu-
sion that section 7 of the Clayton Act90 was applicable to a bank merger 
even after approval by the Comptroller of the Currency. 91 In holding that 
the Comptroller lacked authority to enforce the antitrust laws, the Court 
noted that although the Comptroller was required to consider the anti-
competitive effects of a merger application, "he was not required to give 
this factor any particular weight." 92 Furthennore, there was "no specific 
provision for judicial review of his decision." 93 From the language in these 
cases it would appear that both criteria-explicit statutory authority to con-
sider antitrust variables and judicial review of the exercise of that authority 
-are essential for an implied exemption based upon the "pervasiveness" of 
agency regulation. 
A second type of exemption from the antitrust laws may be implied 
where such an exemption is necessary for the successful operation of a 
regulatory scheme. Whereas an exemption based on "pervasiveness" extends 
to the full scope of the agency's responsibility for providing nonjudicial 
antitrust enforcement, the "necessity" exemption is recognized only to the 
extent that it is essential to the effectuation of the regulatory statute. The 
hallmark case raising the "necessity" inquiry is Silver v. New York Stock 
Exchange.94 Silver, a nonmember of the Exchange who engaged in over-
the-counter trading, had received temporary NYSE approval of wire con-
nections with member firms. When these connections were later severed as 
"required by the Exchange's Constitution and rules," 95 Silver charged that 
the ex parte termination constituted a collective refusal to deal in violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.96 The district court held that the anti-
trust laws were applicable to the NYSE action because the termination of 
the wire connections went beyond the scope of NYSE's power granted by 
the Exchange Act.97 Reversing this decision, the Second Circuit con-
88 49 u.s.c. § 1486 (1964). 
89 374 U.S. 321 (1963); accord, United States v. First Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 376 
U.S. 665 (1964). 
90 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1964). 
Ill The Comptroller General had approved the merger pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 215 
(1%4). Under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (c) (1964), such ap-
proval is conditioned upon the receipt of reports by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Attorney 
General. All three reports concluded that the "merger would have substantial anti-
competitive effects .... " 374 U.S. at 333. 
92 374 U.S. at 351. 
93 /d. 
94 373 u.s. 341 (1963). 
95 /d. at 344. 
96J5 U.S.C. §I (1964). 
97196 F. Supp. 209, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), rev'd, 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 
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strued the Exchange Act as comprehending such activity98 and allowed an 
exemption.99 The Supreme Court declined to follow the rationale of either 
of the lower courts_l<1{) Instead, the Court declared that in the absence 
of the Exchange Act the severance of the wires would "constitute a peT se 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act," 101 but then concluded that the rule 
applied by the NYSE was "germane" 102 ,to its statutory duty of self-
regulationHl3 and therefore within the scope of the Exchange Act. The 
Court recognized that the issue raised by the NYSE action was "the extent 
to which the character and objectives of the duty of exchange self-regulation 
contemplated by the Securities Exchange Act are incompatible with the 
maintenance of an antitrust action." W 4 Nevertheless, this ultimate issue 
was avoided by the Court's decision that the NYSE had exceeded its au-
thority under the Act by severing Silver's wire connections without notice, 
explanation or an opportunity for a hearing, 105 and in so doing had failed 
to reach the "threshold of justification." 1{)6 The Court did state, however, 
that the test for resolving conflicts between antitrust and regulatory statutes 
is the necessity of an antitrust exemption: 
Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Se-
curities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent 
necessary .107 
Application of the Antitmst Laws to the Commission Rate Structure 
The Silver case was purportedly applied in Kaplan v. Leh111an BTothen/08 
373 U.S. 341 (1963) (although the district court's disposition was reinstated, the Supreme 
Court relied on different grounds)._ 
98 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
99 "The Exchange is exempt ... because it is exercising a power which it is required 
to exercise by the Securities Exchange Act." 302 F.2d at 721. 
1oo 373 U.S. at 356-57. 
101/d. at 347, citing Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Colee Co., 364 
U.S. 656 (1961); IGor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion 
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). For a discussion see 
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under tbe Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847 
(1955); Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on 
the !(lor's Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959). 
1o2 373 U.S. at 356. 
103 This was implied by interpreting §§ 6(b), 6(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78f(b), (d) (1964), to include a duty to regulate members' transactions and rela-
tionships with nonmembers. 
104 373 U.S. at 358. 
105/d. at 361-62. 
106Jd. at 365. 
107 !d. at 357. 
lOB 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 3H<J 
U.S.954 (1967). 
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a class action and shareholder's derivative suit directly challenging the com-
mission rate structure as violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. The district 
judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on two grounds: 
First, the complaint alleged a per se violation, 109 and Silver had held that 
action taken by the Exchange' pursuant to its statutory rule-making authority 
could not be per se illegal under the Sherman Act.l10 Even assuming that 
rhe district court was correct in :finding that the Exchange Act "by the 
plainest implication" m vests the NYSE with authority to :fix minimum 
rates, this ground could easily be obviated by drafting pleadings which did 
not rely on the per se argument.112 Furthermore, SilveT explicitly stated that 
:finding an exception to the per se theory was "only the beginning, not the 
end, of inquiry." na 
Second, the district court decided that SEC authorization to alter or sup-
plement NYSE rules preempted antitrust jurisdiction.ll4 The court founded 
this argument on dictum in the majority opinion in SilveT; after emphasizing 
that there was no statutory provision for agency or judicial review of the 
Exchange's termination of Silver's wire connections, Mr. Justice Goldberg 
observed that "[s]hould review of .exchange self-regulation be provided 
through a vehicle other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to anti-
trust exemption would be presented." m The SilveT opinion specifically 
noted that this was "an issue we do not decide today." 116 Furthermore, the 
Kaplan conclusion does not follow inevitably from the dictum on which 
the court relies; Silver never said that such a "different case" would necessi-
tate a different result. The context of Mr. Justice Goldberg's 'remarks sug-
gests that the other vehicle inherent in the regulatory scheme may have to 
protect the same competitive policies that are embodied in the antitrust 
laws.117 At a minimum, Kaplan should have recognized that the Supreme 
Court's language invites some appraisal of the efficacy of the other vehicle 
in protecting the public interest against the Exchange's abuse of its self-
regulatory powers.U8 In sum, the Kaplan opinion inadequately deals with 
109 250 F. Supp. at 564. 
110 373 U.S. at 348-49. 
111250 F. Supp. at 565. 
112 The Department of Justice has apparently taken tllis approach. See SEC Com-
ments on Proposed Rule at 18 n.3. 
113 373 U.S. at 349. 
114 250 F. Supp. at 565-66. 
115 373 U.S. at 360. 
Wl]d. at 358 n.l2. 
117 
"Applicability of the antitrust laws, therefore, rests on the need for vindication 
of their positive aim of insuring competitive freedom. Denial of their applicability 
would defeat the congressional policy reflected in· the antitrust laws without serving 
the policy of Securities Exchange Act." ld. at 360. 
118 Chief Justice Warren, dissenting from the majority's denial of certiorari in 
Kaplan, called the Court of Appeals' opinion "blunderbuss" and "scanty." 389 U.S. at 
957. 
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the complex and i.rnporta..Tlt antitrust issues raised by the NYSE commission 
rate structure, and the Supreme Court's denjal of certiorari merely means 
that these issues have yet to be settled.l19 Accordingly, there must be a full 
analysis of the three legal bases that may be asserted to justify the Ex-
change's long-established practice of fixing minimum commission rates: 
( 1) implied congressional authorization of rate-fixing as an essential part 
of the Exchange's self-regulatory function,120 (2) the displacement of nor-
mal judicial antitrust jurisdiction because of the "pervasiveness" of SEC 
regulation under the Exchange Act,121 and (3) the "necessiry" of minimum 
rates to implement the policies of the Act. 
The Commission Rate Structure and the Self-Regulatory System 
Under the self-regulatory concept embodied in the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934,122 the exchanges are not only the objects of supervision by the 
SEC but also exercise regulatory powers over their own members. As 
pointed out in the Senate Report accompanying the Exchange Act bill, 
the initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining 
to the administration of their ordinary affairs remain with the ex-
changes themselves. It is only where they fail adequately to provide 
protection to investors that the Commission is authorized to step in and 
compel them to do so.123 
119 The Kaplctn opinion has not dissuaded the Department of Justice, see note 112 
supra. 
120 The "implied congressional authorization" argument is a modification of the "ex-
press exemption" rationale. See note 71 supra and accompanying text. In essence, the 
NYSE contends that § 19(b) of the Exchange Act, which provides for SEC review of 
Exchange rules pertaining to "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission," impliedly 
authorizes the exchanges to fix their own rates free from the antitrust laws. 
121 Relying in part upon the Supreme Court's dictum in Silve1·, see text at note 159 
infra, the I'~YSE dues nut specifically argue that the regulatory scheme established by the 
Exchange Act is sufficiently "pervasive" to confer a total exemption upon the Ex-
change. This issue is nevertheless important not only because the Court's conclusion 
is dictum and not necessarily controlling but also because the "pervasiveness" in-
quiry is essential to a complete legal analysis of an implied antitrust exemption. 
122 Former SEC Chairman Douglas graphically described self-regulation as "letting 
the exchanges take t.he leadership with Government playing a residual role. Govern-
ment would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, 
cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used." vV. DouGLAs, 
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82, (Allen ed. 1940). 
123 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). This "partnership between govern-
ment and private enterprise," Silver v. New York Stoclc Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 366 
(1963), was originally a compromise necessitated by the sheer magnitude of such a regu-
latory task, see Hearings on Stock Excbange Practices Bef01·e tbe Senate Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15, at 6582 (1934); the bitter opposition 
of the financial community, see 2 A. ScHLESJNGER, THE AGE OF RoosEVELT, Trm CoMJNG 
oF THE NEw DEAL 463 (1959); and the tradition of Exchange self-regulation itself, see 
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The Act's self-regulatory provisions require the exchanges to register 
with the SEC,124 :file copies of their rules,125 satisfy the SEC that their rules 
are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors," 126 
provide sanctions against rule violations,I27 and agree to enforce the rules.l28 
The statute permits an exchange, once registered, to adopt new rules with-
out prior SEC approval,l211 but the Exchange must :file amendments with the 
SEC.130 
The SEC has direct regulatory authority over several matters, including 
floor trading,l31 specialists and odd-lot dealers, 132 short sales,I33 and manipula-
tive or deceptive devices.l34 There is no provision for SEC review of ex-
change rule enforcement in particular instances, 135 an omission which led 
to the Court's intervention in Silver.136 Nor does the SEC have power to 
penalize members for violating exchange rules.137 The SEC does, however, 
have power to request changes in exchange rules in a wide range of areas. 
Section 19(b) authorizes the Commission to request changes in the rules, 
and if, after an opportunity for a hearing the exchange refuses, the SEC 
may order changes that are 
necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure 
fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or to insure 
fair administration of such exchange ... in respect of such matters as 
Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PRoB. 518, 518-22 (1953). But cf. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) 
(emphasizing the failure of private exchange controls). 
12415 U.S.C. § 78e (1964). 
125 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1964). 
12s15 D.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964). 
127 15 U.S.C. § 78f (b) (1964) (rules must include provisions for expulsion, suspension, or 
disciplinary action against member conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable prin-
ciples of trade .... "). 
12s15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1) (1964). 
121l15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1964). 
13015 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (4) (1964). 
13115 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1964). 
13215 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1964). 
l.3.'l15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1964). 
13415 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b) (1964). 
135 2 L. Loss, SEcUIUTIES REGULATION 1178 (2d ed. 1961). 
136 373 U.S. at 357. 
137 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 704. When an investigation discloses possible violations, 
the SEC usually refers the case to the particular exchange. If the exchange takes 
no action, the Commission can then suspend or revoke the exchange's registration 
under § 19(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1) (1%4), for a violation of its continuing 
duty to enforce its rules and regulations. L. Loss, supra note 135, at 1178; see Baird v. 
Franldin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 
(1944). 
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(9) the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, 
and other charges ... and ( 13) similar matters.l38 
From this section the NYSE concludes that Congress impliedly authorized 
the Exchange to fix minimum commission rates subject to SEC review as 
an essential part of its self-regulatory function.139 However, this contention 
fails upon closer scrutiny of the Act itself, its legislative history, and its 
imple~entation by the SEC. -
The list of items subject to SEC review under section 19(b) is illustrative 
rather than exclusive_H<l Unless the enumerated items and all "similar mat-
ters" are assumed to be indispensable parts of the self-regulatory system, the 
purpose of the provision must be to explain the general scope of SEC review 
rather than insulate all exchange rules from antitrust remedies. Even if some 
kind of rate-fixing were justified, section 19(b) nowhere suggests that a 
minimum schedule of rates is necessary. That section only empowers the 
SEC to alter or supplement exchange rules regarding the fixing of reasonable 
rates, which arguably may .include minimum, maximum or even negotiated 
rates.H 1 Moreover, when Congress has desired to prescribe minimum rates 
in other fields, it has so specified.H2 Here Congress not only failed to 
specifically authorize minimum rates, but on the contrary, employed a 
reasonableness standard which is ambiguous in a rate-fixing contextY3 
138 15 U .S.C. § 78s (b) (1964). The Court has concluded that this section impliedly 
gives the SEC power to "disapprove any rules adopted by an exchange .... " Silver 
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
I39The Exchange also relies upon§ 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(3) (1964), which 
defines a member of an exchange as one who "is permitted ... to effect transactions 
on the exchange ... with the payment of a commission or fee which is less than that 
charged the general public . . . ." The contention is that only by the fixing of a 
uniform minimum commission rate can a "yardstick" be established with which to 
determine if the fee to the general public exceeds the member fee. NYSE Memo. at 
7, TepTimed in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at 83,234 (1968). The 
Department of Justice characterizes the clause merely as an alternative condition to 
exchange membership which becomes inoperative when members can no longer be 
serviced at lower costs. It is neither inconsistent with a competitive rate system nor 
indicative of a congressional intent to impliedly repeal the antitrust laws. Justice 
Dep't Memo. at 30-31. 
140 Justice Dep't Memo. at 23. 
141 "(M]any of the knottiest problems of rate structure and establishment of 
'reasonable' rates ... might be enormously simplified if 'reasonable' rates were not 
necessarily conceived of as minimum ones.'" SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 323. See id., pt. 5, 
at 106-07 (recommending a maximum-minimum schedule); Nerenberg, Applicability of 
tbe Amitmst Lwws to t be Securities Field, 16 VV. REs. L. REv. 131, 150-51 (1964). 
H2 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §§ 13 (4), 15(1), 316(e), 318 (1964) (ICC power to set 
"maximum and minimum" rates for rail, water, and motor carriers); 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1482 (i) (1964) (CAB authorized to Ji, "maximum and minimum" rates for air car-
riers); 47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1964) (FCC power to set "maximum and minimum" rates for 
wire and radio). 
H3 See text at note 167 infTa. 'Vhile the NYSE stresses that the "experience of 
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Since the referen~es to legislative history cited by the NYSE as authoriz-
ing minimum rates are not drawn from a comprehensive discussion of the 
rate structure,144 they are unconvincing in establishing any legislative in-
tent.145 Some of these references allude not to the NYSE but to the Federal 
Trade Commission rate-fixing that was proposed in the original draft, 146 and 
in three other cases appear to contemplate maximum, not minimum, rates.147 
The existence of only eight such references148 in· the volu_minous, multi-
the Exchange and the expertise of the SEC accumulated in applying the statutory 
standard of reasonableness" evidences an implied authority to fix minimum rates, 
NYSE Memo. at 27, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at 
83,243 (1968), the Special Study concludes that this standard has been without "com-
prehensive and consistent public articulation, on the part of the Exchange or the Com-
mission." SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 343. 
144 For general descriptions of the background of the enactment of the Exchange Act 
of 1934, see 2 A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF RooSEVELT, THE CoMING oF THE NEw DEAL 
ch. 29 (1959); Gadsby, Historical Developments of tbe SE.C.-Tbe Government View, 
28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 6 (1959); Tracy and MacChesney, Tbe Securities Excbange Act 
of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REv. 1025, 1033-36 (1934). 
145 An early draft of the Exchange Act contained the phrase "uniform rate" rather 
than "reasonable rate." H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). During the hearings 
on the bill, it was suggested that "uniform" be deleted: 
While ... your bill would give the Federal Trade Commission the right to 
prescribe uniform rates of commission, it does not otherwise authorize the 
Commission to fix rates, which it seems to me it should do and would do by 
striking out the word "uniform." That would permit the Commission to fix 
rates .... [T]he commissions charged should either be fixed by some govern-
mental authority or be supervised by such an authority. As matters now stand, 
the exchange can charge all that the traffic will bear, and that is a burden 
upon commerce. 
Hearings on Stock Excbange Practices Before tbe Senate Cmmn. on Banking and 
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 16, at 7705 (1934). The NYSE concludes that the 
deletion was to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to fix rates, which historically 
means fix minimum rates. NYSE Memo. at 10, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 
(Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at 83,235. The Department of Justice cites the passage to 
demonstrate the breadth of the SEC's powers and the policy of protecting investors 
from excessive rates. Justice Dep't Memo. at 27. However, the Special Study reports 
that no formal explanation was given for the change, SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 300. 
One commentator has inferred from the deletion that Congress did not intend to 
exempt commission rates from the antitrust laws. 19 W. REs. L. REv. 167, 170 n.21 (1967). 
But see Note, Antitrust and tbe Stock Excbange: MininzU11z Commission or Free Compe-
tition?, 18 STAN. L. REv. 213,225 (1965). See also Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 17 
n.26, Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967). 
146 S. 2683 & H.R. 7853, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). 
147 Justice Dep't Memo. at 28, citing 78 CoNG. REc. 8303 (1934) (remarks of Rep. 
Pettengill); id. at 8091-92 (remarks of Rep. Wadsworth); id. at 8490 (remarks of Sen. 
Hastings). 
148 Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before tbe Senate Cmmn. on Banking a'nd 
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 13, at 6075, 6080 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 7852 
and HR. 8720 Before tbe House Comm. on Interstate· and Foreign Commerce, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 320-21, 423-24 (1934); 78 CoNG. REc. 8087, 8092, 8490, 8493 (1934). 
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volume hearings1.10 and extensive debates, 150 and no mention whatsoever 
of minimum rates in the committee151 and conference152 reports, also under-
cuts the NYSE's argument that the fixing of minimum rates was considered 
part of the self-regulatory system of the Exchange Act. 
Because administrative activities pmsuant to the regulatory statute that 
created the agency are helpful in interpreting ambiguous legislative direc-
tives/53 the history of the SEC's use of section 19(b) as a regulatory tool is 
significant. If it could be shown that the SEC carefully scrutinized changes 
in the NYSE commission rate structure, then perhaps the argument that 
Congress intended the Exchange to set minimum rates subject to SEC review 
would be persuasive. On the contrary, however, the Commission's role in 
reviewing previous rate .increases154 has been little more than passive. 15~> 
Although the SEC can force the Exchange to abandon .its minimum com-
mission rates under its general power to request changes in the NYSE's rules, 
the Commission has no procedure for regular or systematic review of the 
Exchange's rules;156 indeed, its power under section 19(b) has been used 
only once in the history of the SEC, and then in an area other than com-
mission rates.w; 
Exemption Based on "Pervasiveness" 
Since the Exchange Act does not expressly provide for an antitrust exemp-
tion, the pattern of regulation under the Act must be examined to determine 
whether SEC and Exchange activities impliedly exempt the 1--JYSE com-
mission rate structure from the antitrust laws. According to the Court, 
14il The Senate hearings alone include twenty parts and over 9,000 pages of testimony. 
150 See 2 L. Loss, SEcURITIES REGULATION 784 n.2 (2d ed. 1961). 
151 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d' 
Con g., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). Both reports refer generally to the SEC's powers under 
§ 19 (b) '\Vith no mention of rate-fixing. 
152 H. R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). 
1G3 See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. liVorlcers, 367 U.S .. 
396, 408 (1961); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 
(1933); United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S.183, 193 (1930). 
15"1 There were increases in 1938, 1942, 1947, 1953, and 1958. For a brief dis--
cussion of the circumstances surrounding these rate increases, see SPECIAL STUDY, 
pt. 2, at 328-33, 344-45. 
155 The SEC did not even complete its review of the 1958 rate increases until several: 
months after the increases took effect. Id., pt. 2, at 332. This inaction has not gone 
uncriticized. See id., pt. 4, at 719; Jennings, Tbe New York Stock Excbange and the 
Cmmnission Rate Struggle, 53 'CALIF. L. REv. 1119,1144 n.86 (1965); Johnson, Application-
of Antitrust Laws to tbe Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Note, Antitrust 
and the Stock E:r:chrmge: .Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REv. 
213,235 (1965). 
15£ SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, at 712. 
157 ld., pt. 2, at 344. For the one case where the SEC invalidated an Exchange rule ... 
see note 27 mp1·a. 
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the first implied exemption inquiry is whether the regulatory scheme estab-
lished by the Exchange Act is sufficiently "pervasive." 158 Although the 
dictum in Silver broadly states that the self-regulatory scheme in· the 
Exchange Act is not "pervasive" enough to create a total exemption,I5ll the 
Court was there dealing with an Exchange rule insulated from SEC review. 
The Court specifically avoided the issue of whether review through a 
vehicle other that the antitrust laws could confer a total exemption.160 This 
reservation suggests that it is at least possible that direct supervision of the 
NYSE by the SEC, regardless of the breadth of the Commission's regulatory 
power, is enough in some contexts to confer an exemption. But whether 
the SEC's supervision over "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission" is 
one of those contexts is the continuing controversy. 
The SEC recognizes that "where the Commission has jurisdiction to re-
view and pass upon particular Exchange activities, as it has in the area of 
commission rates under Section 19(b) ... , antitrust immunity may, under 
some circumstances, be implied." 161 On the other hand, the SEC acknowl-
edges that such an exemption "necessarily contemplates that full con-
sideration be given to the policies of the antitrust laws ... in evaluating any 
aspect of the commission rate structure or any proposals for its revision." 162 
However, unless the SEC has been delegated antitrust responsibilities co-
extensive with its review power, there is still "nothing built into the regu-
latory scheme which performs the antitrust function," 163 and mere agency 
approval or review of private activity pursuant to broad statutory standards 
has rarely been sufficient justification for an exemption.164 Therefore, the 
existence of SEC review of the "fixing of reasonable rates" does not present 
a "different case as to antitrust exemption" 165 from that examined in Silver; 
lliB Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 34I, 347 (1963). 
15ll 373 U.S. at 360-61. 
160 See text at note II5-16 supra. 
161 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 at 1-2 <Jan. 26, I968) (emphasis 
added). Following this reasoning, the SEC in 1965 suggested an extension of its authority 
over the Exchange coupled with an antitrust exemption. II I CoNG. REc. I 90I 9-22 (I 965) 
{letter from Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman, to Sen. A. Willis Robertson, Chairman of 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency). However, the proposal met stiff congres-
sional opposition. See N.Y. Times, Aug. I9, 1965, at 37, col. 6-7 {letter from Rep. 
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, to the SEC vigorously op-
posing any antitrust inlrnunity for the NYSE); id., Sept. 8, 1965, at 63, col. 3 (Sen. Philip· 
Hart opposing any Exchange exemption). 
162 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8329 at 2 (Jan. 26, 1968); see II 1 CoNa_ 
REc. I9021 (1965) (remarl{s of Manuel F. Cohen, SEC Chairman). 
163 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 34I, 358 (1963). 
164 Compare California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (I962) and United States v. Radio 
Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959), with Pan. Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). 
165 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 34 I, 360 (I 963). 
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instead, the reqmsite "pervasiveness" still depends upon the scope of the 
SEC's power to consider antitrust variables. 
While section 19(b) does provide for Commission review of "reasonable 
rates," it does not limit the SEC's power nor delegate the antitrust function 
to the SEC by providing standards comparable to antitrust criteria. Unlike 
the Federal Aviation Act standards which the Court relied on in the Pan 
American case,166 the standard of reasonableness in section 1'9(b) scarcely 
constitutes a mandate to apply antitrust principles. The Supreme Court has 
expressed doubt concerning the reliability of reasonableness in this context 
by remarking that "neither law nor economics has yet devised generally 
accepted. standards for the evaluation of rate-making orders .... " 167 
The absence of antitrust language in the Exchange Act takes on special 
significance when viewed in the light of the Act's other provisions. In the 
first place, the Act preserves all existing rights and remedies.168 This pre-
sumably includes antitrust rights under the Sherman Act, and hence is 
indicative of an intent not to exempt the Exchange activities from antitrust 
considerations by implication. Secondly, in passing other securities laws, 
Congress has expressly provided review standards comparable to antitrust 
criteria where it intended an antitrust exemption. The Maloney Act, 169 a 
1938 amendment to the Exchange Act, requires the registration of national 
associations of over-the-counter securities dealers, and expressly exempts 
these associations from the application of any conflicting laws,ml but con-
166 See note 87 supra. 
167/n re Permian Basin Area Rate, 390 U.S. 747,790 (1968) (dictum). 
Hls "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any 
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity ... " 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78bb(a) (1964). Cf. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) 
(dictum). 
16915 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964). For discussion of the operative features of the Maloney 
Act, see Frey, Federal ,Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Arlarket, 106 
U. PA. L. REv. 1, 43-45 (1957); Westwood & Howard, Self-Gocvemment in the Se-
cw:ities Business, 17 LAw & CoNTEMP. PnoB. 518, 518-25 (1952); Note, Tbe N ASD-
An Unique Experiment in Cooperative Regulation, 46 VA. L. REv. 1586, 1587-89 
(1960); Note, OveT-tbe-Counter Tmding and the Maloney Act, 48 YALE L. J. 633 
(1939). . 
170 "If any provision of this section is in conflict with any provision of any law 
of the United States in force on June 25, 1938, the provision of this section shall 
prevail." 15 V.S.C. § 78o-3(n) (1964). This. section has been interpreted as an ·explicit 
exemption for the over-the-counter dealers. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. 
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 809-10 n.l6 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 227 n.60 (1940); National Ass'n of Securities 
Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 478 n.9 (1945). Some commentators have tried to expli-
cate the difference in congressional treatment of over~the-counter dealers and the 
exchange members by theorizing that the Maloney Act was needed as an incentive to 
join national securities associations, whereas none were needed to bolster exchange 
membership. \iVestwood & Howard, supra note 169, at 528; SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 4, 
at 502-03. 
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ditions their registration with the SEC on the promulgation of rules which 
provide safeguards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of 
commissions . . . [and] remove impediments to and perfect the 
mechanism of a free and open market; and are not designed to permit 
unfair discrimination between customers or issuers, or brokers or 
dealers, to fix minimum profits, to impose any schedule. of prices, or to 
impose any schedule or fix minimum rates of commissions, allowances, 
discounts, or other charges.171 · 
Both the exemption language and the antitrust standards manifest a con-
gressional intent to insulate national securities associations from the anti-
trust laws, while the Exchange Act's regulation of the NYSE and other 
organized securities exchanges is devoid of either type of exempting provi-
sion. Lastly, even if the reasonableness standard encompasses antitrust con-
siderations, the Act is too vague to warrant an antitrust exemption. It not 
only fails to specify how much weight the SEC should give to antitrust 
criteria172 but also neglects to require that the SEC apply the reasonableness 
standard to all NYSE rules. The SEC's discretion in these matters is re-
flected in the fact that SEC powers under section 19(b) have "been formally 
employed only once in the Commission's history, and then in an area other 
than commission rates." 173 In sum, an antitrust. exemption for the commis-
sion rate structure can hardly be based on the "pervasiveness" of a regula-
tory scheme which embodies an inadequate and amorphous standard that 
neither need be nor is applied with any degree of certainty. 
Exemption Based on "Necessity" 
Since the Exchange Act neither specifically authorizes the NYSE mini-
mum rate structure nor establishes a "pervasive" system of SEC supervision 
and Exchange self-regulation, the rate structure's immunization from the 
antitrust laws depends upon its necessity to fulfill the principal policies of 
the Exchange Act-the maintenance of a strong centralized securities market 
and the protection of investors.174 It is not within the scope or competence 
of this Note to resolve the complex economic issues surrounding the im-
pact of the minimum rate structure upon the objectives of the Exchange 
Act; indeed, "no one can be absolutely certain of the consequences of 
171 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (b) (7) (1964). The NYSE emphasizes that this section specifically 
prohibits minimum commission rates while no such provision appears in the Exchange 
Act. NYSE Memo. at 8, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,587 at 
83,234 n.2 (1968). 
172 See text at note 92 supra. 
173 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 344. For the one case where the SEC invalidated an 
Exchange rule, see note 27 supra. 
174 SEC Comments on Proposed Rule at 20. 
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abolishing mi11imum commission rates . . . " 175 However, the areas of 
disagreement between the NYSE and the Justice Department can be de-
lineated and the dispositive factual issues put into proper perspective in order 
to determine how the disagreement might best be settled. 
The NYSE argues that the elimination of minimum commissions would 
have three major adverse effects upon the securities market: ( 1) dampen 
the incentives for Exchange memb;rsJ-.ip, thereby turr1ing the NYSE into 
an association of floor brokers and undermining its function as a central 
auction market, ( 2) produce destructive competition which would bankrupt 
smaller commission-oriented brokerage firms, and (3) lead to discriminatory 
pricing. 
Central Auction Market.-The NYSE contends that in the absence of 
preferential member rates, member firms would withdra-w from the Ex-
change in order to cross mders in their own offices, trade on the third 
market, or negotiate directly with NYSE floor brokers, whichever would 
be the most profitable.m; The impact of this membership decline would be 
severe. There would be an inevitable loss of liquidity in the auction market, 
and the ensuing inability of the Exchange to absorb considerable volumes 
of demand and supply would produce greater price fluctuations, leaving the 
broker unsure of obtaining a sales price reasonably close to the price of the 
previously traded shareP7 Consequently, brokers would exert diligent 
efforts to secure the most favorable prices only on behalf of their large in-
stitutional accounts, not the small investors.178 V\lith the erosion of the 
NYSE as a central auction market, the small investor also would lose other 
benefits of the Exchange, such as the "detailed, continuous record of trans-
actions," 179 and the imposition of "rigorous standards of disclosure" 180 upon 
listed companies. Furthermore, by withdrawing from the Exchange, 
brokerage firms would avoid the extensive self-regulation and surveillance 
175 THE NEw YoRK STocK ExcHANGE, F..EPORT oN nm EcoNOM!C EFFECTS OF NE-
•GOTIAmo CoMMISSION RAms ON THE BRoKERAGE INDUSTRY, THE MARKET FOR CoRPoRAm 
SEcURITIES AND nm INVESTING Punuc 1 (August, 1968) [hereinafter cited as NYSE 
EcoNOMIC REP.]; acc01·d, THE Busil'.'ESS LAWYER, Nov., 1965 at 182 ("You can't quite 
predict what would happen") (remarks of Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel of 
the SEC). 
17~ NYSE EcoNOMIC REP. at 23. The :Hrms most likely to withdraw from Exchange 
membership are the brokers who do business exclusively with the public investor and 
rely upon other members for the floor execution and clearance of these transactions. 
At present there are 134 of these bro]cers accounting for 10% of the total securities 
commission income. ld. To remain competitive, the integrated firms who do execute 
and clear their own orders would then "split into two separate entities, one handling 
public business, the other floor business," with only the former withdrawing. ld. at 25. 
rn ld. at 14-16. 
I78Jd. at 37. 
17D !d. at 39. 
180 ld. at 41. 
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envisioned by the Exchange Act, 181 thereby putting "the immense burden 
of regulating that portion of the industry which had previously been subject 
to Exchange regulation ... upon the SEC, which is not presently equipped 
to discharge such a burden." 182 
The Department of Justice, on the other hand, argues that the mainte-
nance of a centralized market does not depend on artificial incentives such 
as high corrnnission rates; rather, "the economic pressure for efficient trading 
will itself assure the centralized market." 183 Since execution and clearance 
on the Exchange floor would be less costly and time-consuming than trading 
within a single firm, large scale office crosses would be abandoned.UH More-
over, lower commissions produced by a competitive system would strengthen 
the NYSE by stimulating business and recapturing some of the trading lost 
to the third market.185 As for the disincentives produced by the costs of 
self-policing, the incremental costs of Exchange self-regulation over other 
forms of regulation-National Association of Securities Dealers, SEC or 
broker self-imposed regulation-are negligible and therefore not a deterrent 
factor.186 However, even if a significant number of members threatened 
to withdraw from the Exchange, the Justice Department suggests more 
workable alternatives than rate-fixing to preserve a centralized market. 
Either the standard of regulation applicable to nonmembers could be raised,187 
or increased NYSE membership could be fostered by requiring the mem-
bership of all brokerage fi1ms that do a minimum business in listed securi-
ties.188 Accordingly, membership would no longer be governed by the 
highest bid for a seat, but by meeting established qualifications.189 
Destructive Competition.-In those industries characterized by high fixed 
costs, destructive competition occurs when competitive pricing drives prices 
toward an incremental out-of-pocket cost level lower than the average unit 
cost, 1110 thereby "eroding the capital base needed for operations in the public 
interest." 191 It is particularly prevalent during periods of poor business and 
excess capacity because in the short-run it is better to minimize losses by 
producing at the marginal cost level than to stop production comp1etely.192 
I81Jd. at 26. 
182 NYSE Memo. at 20, reprinted in CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~177,587 
at83,240 (1968). 
183 Justice Dep't Memo. at 53. 
184Jd. at 60-61. 
185Jd. at 46. 
186 1 d. at 66. 
187 /d. at 176. 
188Jd. at 177-78. 
189/d. at 178. 
190 NYSE EcoNoMIC REP. at 50. 
191 Justice Dep't Memo. at 108. 
1ll2 NYSE EcoNOMic REP. at 51; see P. SAMUELSON, EcoNOMics: AN INTRODUCTORY 
ANALYSIS 454-55 (6th ed. 1964). 
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Although the function of the competitive price mechanism is to allocate 
society's resources most efficiently by driving useless capacity from the 
market,193 the NYSE argues that excess capacity during slack times must be 
tolerated in order to satisfy greater demands during peak business activity, 
particularly since the securities industry is subject to huge volume fluctua-
tions.194 Furthermore, the Exchange stresses that since the larger brokerage 
houses derive substantial income from their undeP.vriti..Tlg activities, the 
victims of destructive competition would not necessarily be the most in-
efficient firms; diversified firms could withstand a drop in rates, whereas the 
"firms which are heavily commission-oriented would be the ones forced to 
leave the field." 195 
The Department of Justice refutes the J'.:YYSE's forecast of economic 
disaster by challenging the application of a destructive competition model 
to the securities industry. First, fixed costs in brokerage firms, especially 
office space, manpower, and data processing equipment, while high, are not 
immobile; these facilities can be productive in operations other than the 
commission business, such as over-the-counter trading or managing mutual 
fund shares.196 Second, the diversity in both the size of brokerage firms 
and the type of their activities evidences the lack of potential economies of 
scale197 that would lead to a significant concentration of brokers under 
competitive pricing.198 Finally, the need for excess capacity to handle peak 
business loads is illusory; excess capacity to meet increased demand during 
short-run fluctuations, siu.t.il~r to seasonal variations in other industries, is 
considered in ordinary "entrepreneurial decisions." 199 More important, 
however, is the fact that minimum rates alone do not insure adequate fa-
cilities to meet the trading demand. Despite unparalleled prosperity in the 
past, the industry has not yet developed capacity sufficient to handle 
average trading volume.200 If the brokerage firms were com'peting with 
each other, perhaps they would be forced to invest more of their profits in 
these needed facilities.~·ol The Justice Departn1ent further argues that even 
if competitive rates do result in the insolvency of some firms, rate-fixing is 
193 SeeP. SAMUELSON, .mpTa note 192, at 67-68. 
194 NYSE EcoNOMIC REP. at 52. 
1D5Jd.at75. 
196 Justice Dep't j\llerno. at 113-21. 
197 "In economic terms, [economies of scale] exist if average costs per unit of output 
decline with an increase in the size of the firm." I d. at 121. 
198 ]d. at 121-32. 
199/d. at 135, quoting C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST PoLICY 197 (1959). The 
Department of Justice contends that in the securities industry "as in other indus-
tries, normal profit levels would sustain 'peak load' capacities needed for normal 
business." /d. at 136. 
2oo ]d. at 134. 
201 Jd. 
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not the proper preventive since it does not control nonbrokerage activities.202 
Firm solvency can better be protected by expanded supervision,203 and in-
vestors might best be protected against loss by the establishment of a man-
datory system of customer insurance for brokers.204 
Discriminatory Pricing.-The NYSE emphasized that the effects of a 
competitive pricing system on the financial security of individual investors 
are even,more far-reaching, for destructive competition also implies undue 
discrimination in pricing. During slack periods brokers would cut their 
rates to the level of variable costs only for the economically powerful in-
stitutional accounts.205 At this low rate, the institutional accounts would be 
making no contribution to fixed costs, so the broker would be forced to 
shift all fixed costs to "smaller, less-powerful traders." 206 However, the 
Justice Department views this development as remote since some brokers 
could realize greater profits by undercutting the rates of the diversified 
firms and specializing in small investor trading.2D7 If necessary, a "posting 
system" could be established under SEC auspices to require brokers to an-
nounce rates on small transactions,208 thus providing an inexpensive pro-
cedure for full disclosure. 
The Department of Justice stresses two other characteristics of competi-
tive rates: their substantial benefits to the securities market, and their 
feasibility. Not only would prices be forced down to levels reflecting true 
costs but the problems associated with reciprocity arrangements and give-
ups would be elirninated.209 Moreover, the quality of ancillary services 
would be enhanced. By segregating the cost of these services from the 
total commission cost, customers could avoid payments for "tie-in" services, 
"churning," and "dead weight" promotional material.2w And since the in-
stitutional investor would still demand research services, the same in-
formation could be made available to small investors at a nominal fee. 211 
The· feasibility of competitive rates is evidenced by past experience in in-
stitutional trading and trading in the over-the-counter markets.212 Because 
bargaining for give-ups by institutional investors is analogous to price 
negotiations between buyers and sellers, competitive pricing "would [not] be 
2D2Jd. at 180. 
203 !d. at 181. 
204Jd. The Department of Justice recommended a system of public insurance similar 
to that established by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1964). 
205 NYSE EcoNoMIC REP. at 83-87. 
206Jd. at 84. 
207 Justice Dep't Memo. at 185. 
20BJd. at 188. 
209 See supra notes 26-47 and accompanying text. 
210 Justice Dep't Menio. at 82-84. 
211Jd. at 86. 
212Jd. at 88-96. 
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any different ... mechanically, than what goes on today." 213 Furthermore, 
the over-the-counter markets.in listed and unlisted securities have operated 
without a fixed minimum with no adverse effects upon either the brokers 
or the investing public.2 1-1 Trading in these markets is "characterized by 
vigorous, healthy competition at substantially lower rates." 215 
_..., . 
LDNCLUS!ON 
When omnipresent antitrust policy coHides with a congressional attempt 
to regulate a segment of the national economy, there remains the di..'Ecult 
problem of reconciling conflicting mandates. ln resolving these conflicts 
courts have had difficulty in formulating helpful principles beyond the 
general rule that antitrust exceptions are narrowly construed. Subject to this 
general rule, implied exemptions are based upon either the "pervasiveness" 
of agency regulation or the "necessity" of the activity in question in achiev-
ing the objectives of the regulatory scheme. Juxtaposing the traditional 
minimum commission rate structure of the NYSE with these standards, 
SEC supervision of certain of the Exchange's self-regulatory activities lacks 
a sufficiently explicit congressional directive for antitrust variables to be 
considered "pervasive." Although "necessity" then remains the dispositive 
factual inquiry, it must further be determined which forum can bestresolve 
this issue. 
Courts 
Although one district court has bluntly concluded that the NYSE rate 
structure is exempt from the antitrust laws,21'6 subsequent courts may be 
asked to decide whether the rate structure is "necessary" to the objectives 
of the Exchange Act. If such a case arises, the burden of justifying the 
rate structure's necessir-y would be upon the Exchange because an implied 
exemption based on "necessity" operates as an affirmative defense to an 
antitrust claim. The Court in Silver supponed this burden of proof alloca-
tion by remarking that an activity "within the scope and purposes of the 
Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as justified in answer to the as-
sertion of an antitrust claim." 211 The Department of Justice has persuasively 
rebutted each argument the NYSE has put forth in support of an antitrust 
exemption, and unless the Exchange can disprove the feasibility of the Jus-
tice Department's suggested alternatives218 for avoiding the :financial hard-
ships of competitive rates, the burden will not have been discharged. 
213 !d. at 91. 
214Jd. at 93. 
215 !d. at 95. 
216 Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967). 
217 373 U.S. at 361. 
218 See text at notes 187-89, 203-04, 208 supra. 
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The more important question, however, is whether a court is the proper 
forum for resolving the "necessity" issue. In most antitrust trials, the ulti-
mate disposition is a factual determination supported by extensive factual 
data. But in judging the effects of a competitive_ pricing system on the 
securities market, the courts are faced with diverse economic theories, all 
speculative in nature. The judicial system does not have the flexibility to 
fashion and adopt an imaginative remedy repleat with appropriate safe-
guards; the judge can only decide either that the rate structure is necessary 
and therefore exempt from the antitrust laws, or that the structure is un-
necessary and open to antitrust attack. Where the ultimate decision has 
profound effects upon the economy, and where alternative forums for re-
solving the issue are available, the courts should exercise restraint and leave 
jurisdiction to more flexible and expert bodies. 
Congress 
Because of the far-reaching effects that may result from an application 
of the antitrust laws to the NYSE's minimum rate structure, the "necessity" 
issue is of a uniquely legislative character and could best be handled by 
Congress. If minimum rates are essential, an express statutory exemption 
from the antitrust laws can be enacted; otherwise, Congress can expose the 
rate structure to the antitrust laws or abolish minimum rates completely. 
Congress might also determine that the SEC is the most appropriate body to 
decide the rate structure issue; clear legislative language could easily confer 
the necessary jurisdiction, either with or without an antitrust exemption. 
Congress, however, has previously been requested to resolve these problems 
and has refused to act.219 
New York Stock Exchange 
The most expedient method of handling the problems posed by the 
NYSE's minimum rate structure is for the Exchange itself to attempt to 
resolve the issue, either by an abolition of minimum rates, or more realis-
tically, by adopting a plan whereby minimum rates are gradually lowered 
in specified types of transactions until the effects of total abolition can be 
determined. If the exchange truly believes that minimum rates are necessary 
to the securities industry, it at least has the responsibility of demonstrating 
the impracticability of the Justice Department's suggested alternative 
measures. Unfortunately, such a responsibility has not yet been accepted 
by the NYSE. In the incipient phases of the present controversy, the 
Exchange favored the retention of give-ups, but after the intervention of the 
219 See note 161 supra. 
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Department of Justice, the Exchange restricted give-ups220 and adopted an 
interim commission rate structure221 in an effort to shield itself from anti-
trust attack. Similarly, the NYSE's economic study concluded that fixed 
rates were necessary; however, continued criticism appears to have in-
fluenced the Exchange to reconsider its position by initiating a new study.222 
A more open approach by the NYSE would have the advantage of engaging 
the expertise and experience of that bod}' in exploring the feasibilir; of 
competitive rates. .Moreover, such an approach would demonstrate that the 
Exchange's entrenched position is motivated by the public interest, not by 
a desire to solidify its lucrative monopoly on the commission business. 
Securities Exchange Commission 
Because of the expertise of the SEC in the securities area, and because 
the Commission is ostensibly neutral and apolitical, that body is the most 
realistic choice to resolve the "necessity" issue. By applying its expertise to 
the information gathered in the recent hearings, the SEC may be able to 
determine whether the minimum rates are necessary to fulfill the policies 
of the Exchange Act. If so, the Commission can authorize the NYSE to 
continue its present practices, but under more detailed supervision. If the 
minimum rate structure is not necessary, the Commission, pursuant to sec-
tion 19(b), can order the Exchange to institute a competitive system. 
However, considering the speculative nature of the economic issue, it is 
probable that a concrete resolution is impossible. Therefore, the SEC has the 
responsibility to use its discretion in seeking a solution to the controversy. 
At present, the most feasible solution is the Justice Department's sugges-
tion223 that minimum commissions be eliminated immediately on transactions 
over 1~50,000, with a 1PO,OOO reduction every year for the ensuing five years. 
While this plan appears to discriminate against the small investor, it allows 
the SEC to evaluate the effects of eliminating the minimum rate structure 
before total elimination .. 
The need for careful evaluation prior to any transition to competitive rates 
has been demonstrated by the length and completeness of the SEC hearings. 
Because of the historical existence of the minimum rate structure and the 
NYSE's insistence that minimum rates are necessary to a viable securities 
industry, the courts, Congress~ the ]\J''/SE and the SEC have been reluctant 
to change the status quo without knowing the full consequences of such a 
change. The speculative nature of a shift to competitive rates and the 
sensitivity of the securities business surely demand caution, but not inaction. 
P. C. G. 
22o See note 37 sup·ra. 
221 See notes 51 & 54 mpra. 
222 See note 54 supu1. The 1'-,TYSE has recently challenged the Dep't of Justice's eco-
nomic position. CCI-1 FED. SEc. L. REP. (Current vol.) ~ 77,707 (1969). 
223 See note 7 supm. 
